

**United States Geospatial Intelligence Foundation**

**GEOINT Symposium 2012:  
Creating the Innovation Advantage**

**Opening Keynote Address by James R. Clapper Jr.,  
Director of National Intelligence**

**Moderator:  
Joan A. Dempsey,  
USGIF Board of Directors,  
and Senior Vice President,  
Booz Allen Hamilton**

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DIRECTOR JAMES CLAPPER: Well, thank you, Joan, very much for that very generous, gracious introduction. And thanks to the U.S. Geospatial Intelligence Foundation for setting the example, the premier example for a professional association. And Joan very appropriately and very aptly, I think, recognized Stu Shea, who's been with it since the start. And Stu, I just want to add my endorsement to what – the tribute that Joan just paid. It's well deserved.

The foundation is truly exceptional at showcasing GEOINT tradecraft and bringing together government, industry, academia, allies, state and local officials and others involved in national security who share a passion for this crucial field. Thanks to Keith Masback, an old friend and colleague, for his leadership and for the great work of his superb staff.

And a huge thank-you as well to all the corporate participants, without whom, literally, this event wouldn't happen; and because of you, GEOINT this year is bigger and better than ever. It's certainly been personally very gratifying for me to see this mature from its comparatively modest beginnings in the first symposium we had in New Orleans in 2003.

And while I'm at it, I also want to recognize Tish Long, who's turned things I only talked about when I was director of NGA into reality. I am so proud of her and her leadership at NGA. She's truly put GEOINT into the hands of the customers, including, by the way, customer number one. And as an IC leader, she's punching way above her weight, which is always a dangerous metaphor when referring to a woman, but in Tish's case I'm absolutely safe. (Laughter.) And by the way, a belated happy 16<sup>th</sup> birthday to NGA a week ago yesterday.

Now, I'm especially pleased to be here in Orlando. Actually, these days I'm pleased to be anywhere outside Washington. (Laughter.) Now, Walt Disney didn't pick this place by accident. The weather here is usually good, so it's a great place to do things outdoors, normally, things like riding a motorcycle. Now, I'm not a biker, but buying a Harley and riding across America has crossed my mind once or twice, although Sue always immediately uncrosses it for me. In fact, the closest I'm allowed to come to a motorcycle is my Harley Davidson pen.

But I do believe there's profound wisdom that comes from old bikers – in life and, when you think about it, for intelligence. You may have heard a few of their wise musings, such as, a bike on the road is worth two in the shop. There are old bikers, there are drunk bikers, but there are no old drunk bikers. The only good view of a thunderstorm is in your rear view mirror. Never be afraid to slow down. Only bikers understand why dogs love to stick their heads out car windows. Pie and coffee are as important as gas. Never mistake horsepower for staying power. Well-trained reflexes are quicker than luck. If you really want to know what's going on, watch what's happening at least five cars ahead; and I'd ask you to hold that thought, because I'll come back to it later. Everyone crashes. Some get back on; some don't; some can't. If you think your head is only worth \$5, get a \$5 helmet. And last but not least, maintenance is as much art as it is science.

And this brings to mind – all of this brings to mind a best-selling book written some 40 years ago called “Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance.” Now, just bear with me so you know where I’m going here. And it really wasn’t about Zen and it really wasn’t about motorcycle maintenance, either. It was really a philosophy book about the search for quality and what that really means. I think that book and bikers have some important insights for what we all do, because I think it can help us all better understand intelligence integration and why I think we need to pursue it.

One important theme in the book is the attempt to reconcile what’s called the classic mode of thought – that is, reason, science and fact – with the romantic mode – imagination, art and feeling: in a nutshell, putting together logic with creativity and innovation. And when you think about it, the profession of intelligence is a unique amalgam of science and art. And it certainly rings true with the theme of this year’s symposium: creating the innovation advantage.

Anyway, back in ancient Greece around the time Socrates was still a kid, there was a split in the way academics started thinking. Before then, there was no division in Western thought between good and truth, mind and matter, subject and object, form and substance. These are all man-made divisions, and they started right about then. “Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance” argues that quality and value and truth are what actually exist in the real world. And I think you could easily extend that thesis to intelligence as well.

We split intelligence into HUMINT, SIGINT, GEOINT, any number of “INTS,” even as we try to improve them and make them work together. But these are all man-made constructs too. We refer to them as stovepipes, silos or cylinders of excellence, but we actually achieve the highest quality and value when we put them all together. That brings us closer and closer to the truth, to the elusive holy grail of perfect intelligence – acknowledging, of course, that we’ll never achieve absolute perfection, the absolute God’s-eye, God’s-ear certitude about events past, present or future. I would ask that you hold that thought, too, since I’ll come back to it later as well. And even if we figured out every secret, there will always be unsolvable mysteries. But the more we can bring everything together and the closer we can actually integrate intelligence from different sources, the nearer we’ll get to that always-elusive holy grail – truth and quality.

So forgive the heavy philosophy a little bit to explain why I feel so strongly about intelligence integration, which has been my primary focus as director of national intelligence. So in the spirit of “Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance,” I’ve got five topics I’d like to cover and then I’ll take some questions.

First, I want to give a bit shout-out to all of our allies and friends from around the world. I’m glad you could be here so I can thank you directly for what you do. We’re bound tightly to our allies and friends now more so than ever before. Allied participation in the National System For Geospatial Intelligence has really matured, another emphasis area of Tish’s. In the book I just mentioned, the author, Bob Persig, talks about how when you’re struggling, even if you think you’re on the path to enlightenment, finding someone else who thinks like you, even if they’re from another country, is, quote, something close to a blessed event. It must be how Robinson Crusoe felt when he finally found footprints; he knew he wasn’t alone.

I just got back last week from a brief visit to Australia, and prior to that, was in the Asia-Pacific region and sort of had a reaffirmation of what I just said. The specific purpose of a brief visit to Australia was to attend what's called the Intelligence Policy Forum for senior-level national security officials from several close allies to meet. We're working hard on what we call Safeguard, which has two dimensions: strengthening our IT security and synchronizing our personnel security standards – always a sensitive subject. I feel very strongly about this initiative, since these two security enablers represent the foundational basis for even more collaboration and integration, both internally among ourselves – and I'll speak to that – as well as our allies.

My second topic concerns what I'll call two big ideas for the future of the intelligence community. In "Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance," the author talks about getting stuck on a problem or a while, which he calls, appropriately enough, stuckness. And sometimes that's the state you have to be in temporarily before you can come up with a solution to break out of the stuckness. Sometimes you can and end up with something even better.

Last year at this event, I briefly spoke about our new ICIT Enterprise architecture plan. (Pronouncing the acronym "eyesight.") We call it ICITE, for the initials I-C-I-T-E. The plan is centered on cloud computing and cloud storage and attendant security enhancements bound up somewhat in the bumper-sticker slogan, "tag the data, tag the people." And if we execute this right, we'll save a lot of money. But maybe even more importantly, the IC will be able to take intelligence integration to the next level, so as we transition from individual, agency-centric IT, in what I would charitably call a confederation, to an enterprise model that shares resources and data.

Now this is something, as all of you know, we've talked about for years but just never had the incentive to actually do it. Now we do have that incentive, big time, and so now we must do it. We were, I think, somewhat in a state of stuckness. We progressed from concept to design to development, and importantly, we built our budgets around this integrated architecture, so we're putting our programmatic money where our mouths are. Therefore, as Dave Petraeus said – and it's crucial that he did – quote, "we're all in."

By March of 2013, we expect to have initial operating capability for an IC cloud and a common IC desktop. The CIA and NSA are leading the cloud development. NGA, with DIA as a partner, is developing common desktop service for the IC that may look very similar to the model used at the NGA's beautiful new Campus East. And it will evolve over time to integrate all IC requirements based on the NCE model.

The goal is that by 2018, the target architecture should be in place and in use. I'm very pleased that the intelligence community chief information officer, Al Tarasiuk, is here and will be speaking right after me on a panel. And I know he'd love to take your questions about this, so save your ICITE questions or Al.

The second big idea centers around the way we think about so-called MULTI-INT, which will be ultimately, I believe, manifested in the future generation overhead architecture. Now,

obviously, I need to be a little circumspect in this setting, but suffice to say here the division is to bring the disciplines of SIGINT and GEOINT together in the same time domain. The emphasis will be working on problems, focusing on activity in a much more integrated and agile way than we do now. It will enable us to look at activity in an area over time, to better forecast events and quickly alert analysts to where the action is. Relatedly, we'll automate change detection across our intel systems based on user-defined algorithms and recognition of events in videos and open source. This will lead to greater cross-INT, cross-domain and cross-agency tipping and cueing of our collection whenever things or activities of interest are detected.

So for those of you who can attend the classified forum at Cape Canaveral later this week, my principal deputy, Stephanie O'Sullivan, and Director of the NRO Betty Sapp will address the plan for overhead architecture in much greater detail. But that's – so that's about all I can say about it in this setting.

The third topic I'd like to touch on is security. We now have two separate FBI criminal investigations under way for some egregious leaks, and so we've outraged about this to a fare-thee-well in Washington. By the way, you know, the word "outrage" is now a verb. I can actually conjugate it for you. I outrage, you outrage, he, she, it outrages, we outrage, you outrage, they outrage. In the face of all this, we're doing some things to try to stop the hemorrhaging. And I feel very strongly that we in the IC should set the example for everyone in the entire government.

So this includes – and this is internal to the intelligence community – more auditing and monitoring of our IT networks across the IC; two, standardizing the counterintelligence polygraph question that deals with divulging classified information to unauthorized recipients, for those who are susceptible to a polygraph exam; three, investigating leaks more aggressively by my inspector general, the IC IG; four, a subject near and dear to many of you in this room, reforming how we clear people in the first place – so I'll go into a little bit more detail on this one.

As you know, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act established some stringent standards on the time required to clear people. In 2005, the average security investigation, start to finish, took 256 days, with top-secret investigations averaging 315 days, more than 10 months. In 2010, we decreased the processing time for 90 percent of clearances to an average of 54 days, less than two months, exceeding the IRTPA goals. But admittedly, this was done through brute force, adding to the marching army of contract investigators and putting on many more adjudicators. And in the third quarter of FY '12, this was down across the government to 53 days. I know all of you have urban-legend vignettes about, you know, clearance cases that didn't work in your case. But again, this is across the entire government, which, of course, transcends the intelligence community.

We're pushing to institute more automation and more focused investigations to further streamline the process. And then once cleared, we're pushing the idea of continuous evaluations rather than the periodic investigations approach we've always used. Several agencies, including Army, State and NSA, are conducting pilot programs along this line, and they look – it looks pretty promising.

And, of course, another subject of urban legend is promoting reciprocity, the fifth area we're working to improve in terms of security and efficiency, so that people once cleared are able to move from one organization to another or one contract to another and still be considered cleared.

So we're going to push hard. I have taken this on myself, actually started when I was USDI and sort of carried that over to this job. And we're going to push hard on all these initiatives. But in the end, despite whatever security enhancements we're able to make, this is still fundamentally all about personal trust. We've had egregious violations of this trust in the past and we'll have them in the future no matter what we do to try to prevent and deter them.

My fourth topic is the recent attack and assassination of Ambassador Chris Stevens and three others in Benghazi, Libya. While I was in Australia, I was honored with a rare award from the Australian government, presented by the governor general, for my more than two decades promoting the intelligence relationship between our two countries. Many nice things were said about and to me. It was both touching and very humbling.

So I flew back to Washington and I'm reading the media clips about the hapless, hopeless, helpless, inept, incompetent DNI because I acknowledged publicly that we didn't instantly have that God's-eye, God's-ear certitude about an event, as I mentioned earlier. It kind of made me want to get right back on the plane and go back to Australia.

I'm not going to speak to any specifics here, but I would like to quote at some length from a very thoughtful article that Paul Pillar, a friend and colleague with whom I taught at Georgetown, wrote last week. I do so because it deeply resonated with me based on my own up-close and personally intense experiences with the investigations of the Khobar Towers bombing in 1996, when I certainly first got religion about terrorism, and later the Fort Hood shootings in 2009.

My experience in these two tragic events can be extrapolated. Any event like this, involving loss of life, is highly charged, emotionally and politically. So I offer this in the spirit of sharing what I have personally experienced. If there is a message, it is one equally applicable to the executive and the legislative branches of the government, each of whom have their respective responsibilities to discern what actually happened, to derive lessons learned and to help prevent similar tragedies in the future. And it is, I would hope, equally instructive for the media, as well.

Paul's article so resonated with me and so succinctly captured the balance and perspective that I believe all three institutions of our system – the executive, the legislative and the Fourth Estate, the media – need to bear in mind. And I quote as follows:

The seemingly endless public rehashing of the attack in Benghazi that killed the U.S. ambassador and three other Americans is not taking a form that serves any useful purpose. That would be true even without the political slant that has stemmed from efforts to turn some of the

recriminations into a campaign issue. The loss of the four public servants was a tragedy. The rehashing does not alleviate that tragedy. Some relevant truths should be recalled.

One, diplomacy – parenthetically, by the way, like military service and intelligence service – is a dangerous line of work. The Memorial Wall at the State Department listing the many U.S. diplomats, going back more than two centuries, who have been killed in the line of duty is a reminder of that. There is an inherent tension for diplomats between doing their duties well, with everything it entails regarding contact and exposure in faraway places, and living and working securely.

Two, hindsight is cheap. After any incident such as this, one can uncover warnings that might have been applicable to the incident and occurred – that occurred, measures that could have been taken that conceivably could have prevented the occurrence and various other what-ifs. What does not routinely get noted is that the same sorts of things could be unearthed about countless other facilities that did not get attacked and countless other lethal incidents that do not occur. What is unearthed is a product of the second-guesser's luxury of hindsight. And I can say that since on at least two occasions, I've been one of those second-guessers. One can always construct an after-the-fact case that any one such incident was preventable. This is not the same as saying that such incidents in the aggregate are preventable.

Three, resources are limited; threats are not. Even if U.S. diplomats consistently opted for living securely over doing their jobs well, total security cannot be bought. Second-guessing about how much more security should have been provided at any one facility rather than any of dozens of others elsewhere that did not happen to get attacked this time is just another example of hindsight.

Four – and this is crucial – information about lethal incidents is not total and immediate. The normal pattern of such events is for explanations to evolve as more and better information becomes available. We would and should criticize any investigators who settle on a particular explanation early amidst sketchy information and refuse to amend that explanation even when more and better information came in. A demand for an explanation that is quick, definite and unchanging reflects a naïve expectation or, in the present case, irresponsible politicking. The public second-guessing does nothing to honor the services of those Americans who died, and it does nothing to prevent similar incidents.

The secretary of state has, per standard procedures, appointed an accountability review board led by a highly respected and experienced retired diplomat, Thomas Pickering, to assess what happened in Benghazi. And by the way, we have a very capable former intelligence officer who also is serving on this board. So let the board do its job, end of quote.

My fifth and last topic, moving from one somber subject to another, is to briefly address the specter of sequestration, the so-called fiscal cliff we're about to drive over unless the Congress takes action. In short, in the classic staff officer bottom line up front, if sequestration is allowed to happen, it will be disastrous for intelligence. And it isn't just the amount of the cut. You can all do the math. It's the manner in which it would have to be taken. The appropriations committees have directed that the National Intelligence Program will be arrayed in some 700 PPAs, or program project activities, and each and every one of them would be proportionately cut, leaving me as program manager absolutely no latitude on taking cuts or protecting key

activities or programs. And this could mean significant reductions in our most valuable asset, our people. And every major systems acquisition program in the NIP is in jeopardy of being wounded.

So we can only hope that the lame-duck Congress, which returns after the election, will do something to avert this train wreck. I hope they think about the wisdom of bikers. Remember, safety involves watching what's happening at least five cars ahead. And the worst part is that if it happens, it would occur during a time of the most diverse and demanding array of threats I've seen in almost 50 years in this business. And I can assure you that to the extent that I have any influence, for as long as I have influence, I'll do my damndest to minimize the damage.

So on that happy truth-to-power note, I'll stop and take some questions. And I'm depending on Joan to be my filter. Thanks very much. (Applause.)

JOAN DEMPSEY: Thank you, Director Clapper. That was a tremendous speech for us here today, and it's generated a lot of questions, which I appreciate, since I forgot to do the one thing that I intended to do up here first, and that's tell you to send up questions, because you really don't want me to make them up. (Chuckles.) Following on the theme of your speech, there was a question that says, another biker saying is that tonnage has right of way. In the IC, this also applies to very large businesses getting the overwhelming majority of attention and contracts for innovation. How can very small businesses with great innovative ideas and technologies get some attention? (Applause.)

DIR. CLAPPER: Well, one of the things you do is be here. I have – whatever job I had at the time, or even when I was out of a job – (chuckles) – which I may be on the 21<sup>st</sup> of January – (laughter) – I'll have – I'll have both feet in assisted living. But this is – this is a great opportunity – (laughter) – and this is why the USGIF is such a great forum. And there are other associations like this. I think all the agencies – I know NGA does. I do at ODNI. We are very open to hearing from innovative solutions, innovative proposals, particularly by people that aren't in the business necessarily.

So I think there are outlets there. At risk of giving her business than she might want, but my point of contact for this at ODNI is Dawn Meyerriecks, the assistant director of national intelligence for acquisition, technology and facilities. Dawn also oversees IARPA, which is a tremendous engine for innovation and which engages a great deal with innovators, academics that have nothing to do with the intelligence business but who offer solutions. So I do think there's outlets for it, opportunities if you take advantage of them.

MS. DEMPSEY: All right, great. A lot of questions about commercial imagery. Let me try to summarize where those questions are coming from. Can you explain why the nation would be better served by reductions in funding for commercial remote sensing, which has forced the merger of the two current domestic providers, thus reducing competition in the industry, and particularly given that the government stimulated development of a commercial imagery capability?

DIR. CLAPPER: Well, there's no bigger fan of commercial imagery than I. I was a fan of it when it wasn't fashionable, right after I was – became director of NIMA then in 2001. And

commercial imagery has tremendous advantages. It's unclassified. It can be shared with – easily with foreign – for allies and partners, and it's a great asset domestically as well. But as I alluded last year when we were going through the administration reductions, the first time we've taken any – had to take any since 9/11, you know, we have to make a risk versus gain – you know, it's risk management.

I was just thinking this morning that in the last two years or so that I've been DNI, I can recall specific entities, whether on the Hill or outside studies, telling me that I need to do more, and then fill in the blank: I need to do more on China; I need to do more on North Korea; I need to do more on Iran; I need to do more on the Mideast; I need to do more on human trafficking; I need to do more to prevent atrocities; I need to do more about drugs; I need to do more about cyber; I need to do more about counterintelligence; I need to do more about counterproliferation; I need to do more about counterterrorism. So the list goes on. And in a – in a constrained funding environment, very hard choices have to be made based on demand signals and what it – what it is that we actually need.

All we've done here, at least what has been proposed, is to decline the slope of increase slightly on commercial imagery. It's still very important, and we'll still need it. But in the – in the whole spectrum of this, the whole landscape of the entirety of the National Intelligence Program, that for which I'm responsible, as opposed to what I used to be responsible for in the Pentagon as the Military Intelligence Program executive – so we had to make some hard choices, and based on the demand and the – and the requirement versus what we can afford.

MS. DEMPSEY: Director Clapper, you just gave a long list of areas of focus for the intelligence community. Within that long list, what are the issues that you are most concerned about? Other than the Congress, maybe, what keeps you up at night?

DIR. CLAPPER: Well, I think the general answer to what keeps me up at night is what I don't know. The threats that you do know something about, at least that's something you can do something about, you can manage; you can try to focus more attention on it. It's the – it's the unknowns, the unknown unknowns, to borrow a phrase, that most concern me.

I think these days a growing concern – and I'm sure you're going to hear about this from Keith Alexander – is the cyber dilemma that we have in this country, in cyber protection and, in turn, the intelligence resources that – and capabilities that we are able to mount against it. And of course, this is in the – in the backdrop of all the other demands for intelligence support.

MS. DEMPSEY: Director Clapper, you talked about the integration of GEOINT and SIGINT. What about MASINT?

DIR. CLAPPER: Well, that's – actually, the objective here would be to, you know, amalgamate all of them. And to the extent that we can get more intel playing in the – in the same time domain, this is something that I think the two disciplines and the two agencies responsible for them, of SIGINT and GEOINT, have come a long way in terms of collaboration. MASINT obviously fits in that whenever it can play in the – in the – in the same time domain. So I didn't mean to slight MASINT fans by omitting that reference to that discipline.

MS. DEMPSEY: You spoke about the possibility of sequestration and how devastating it would be in the community. Are you looking at plans for consolidation of IC activities? How

do you think about cuts to the government and the contractor workforce? And do you think about those cuts in an integrated whole?

DIR. CLAPPER: Well, yes. As this – as the picture becomes clearer and if, in fact, you know, January 2<sup>nd</sup> rolls around and nothing has been – nothing has been happened to either delay or obviate sequestration, we'll obviously have to do that, and that will be – clearly, my objective would be to do this holistically, looking at the entirety. And this will have – for the reasons I outlined in my remarks, particularly unless the PPA array for us is changed, that's going to be a tough challenge. But this will have impacts on us across the board. Government, contractor, civilian, military – it will have a big impact on all of us. And so as I said, all I can say here is – and I will certainly – for as long as I'm able, I'll do my best, my damndest to obviate the impacts. But if that happens, it's going to be very painful for all of us.

MS. DEMPSEY: You spoke about the need to improve security today, particularly personnel security. Have you considered a single organizational (sic) responsible for clearance for all agencies?

DIR. CLAPPER: No, I have not. I don't think necessarily one size can fit all. I think what I can do and am doing is to promote standardization as much as I possibly can. You know, I got into this polygraph thing and found that we really haven't had IC-wide policies on administration of the polygraph. So I recently promulgated, for example, a first-ever complete set of training standards for polygraphers and for investigators and for adjudicators. And in the case of investigators, I had co-signed this with the OPM director, John Berry, to encompass both suitability and security. So what I think I should be doing is not establishing one size fits all but rather some commonality in policies and standards.

MS. DEMPSEY: There are several organizations in the intelligence community, specifically in our own NGA, who are moving forward with the science of MULTI-INT and the imperative to move forward. What is your vision for MULTI-INT, and who – what office specifically owns the MULTI-INT problem and solution?

DIR. CLAPPER: Well, I attempted to speak to that circumspectly. I acknowledged in my remarks – and I kind of use the – I think, to me, is the vision for the future, which I think will have a profound impact on the way we do collection management as an integrated whole and what that portends for the intelligence business in general. I don't think, again, this is – this is something you assign to an office (symbol ?). I think this is something that needs to overtake – actually, you know, overtake the culture. And of course, that's – as you all know, is the hardest thing to change is culture. But I think this is – holds so much promise for the future and so much promise for change that I think that's a – that's just a good way to think about it.

MS. DEMPSEY: Director Clapper, what do you see as the most driving imperatives for GEOINT today, persistence, integration, collaboration or something else altogether?

DIR. CLAPPER: All the above.

MS. DEMPSEY: (Chuckles.) I sort of expected that one. Can you talk about warning? You mentioned Benghazi and the challenges of providing warning in a situation like that. How do we do warning today, and how can we improve warning for the future, particularly when we're talking about 17 agencies within the intelligence community?

DIR. CLAPPER: Well, one of the features of the way I've tried to approach integration, at least at the national intelligence level, is the combining of what had been the separate pillars, if you will, of collection and analysis into one organization, headed by Deputy Director for National Intelligence Robert Cardillo. And under Robert are a network of 16 or 17 NIMs, as we call them, national intelligence managers, four of which will have a regional and functional focus.

And my approach to this warning business is that it is inherent in each one of those topic or subject areas. The subject of warning – you know, always a controversial subject. It always comes up again when we have an incident like this. I think from a strategic standpoint, I don't think anyone who was involved in this, to include the people at the missions in question – and by the way, we had demonstrations of one form or another, some quite violent, in some 54 countries at the height of this recent siege. And no one harbored any illusions about that.

Of course, the challenge is always the tactical warning, the exact insight ahead of time that such an attack was going to take place. And obviously, we didn't have that. And I think this somewhat gets into the, you know, mysteries versus secrets thing. If people don't behave and emit a behavior or talk or do something else ahead of time and if you don't detect it, it's going to be very hard to predict the exact – and come up with the exact tactical warning you need. And this is another case of that. And we will probably – we're going to be in this sort of environment – this is kind of the – in many cases overseas, is going to be the new normal. And people are going to have to be on the alert. And I don't – in my travels around these places, I don't – I've not run into anyone who is naïve about the potential for such violence.

MS. DEMPSEY: Director Clapper, how do we make GEOINT data authoritative to better support all-source and sensor integration now that everyone can be a producer and consumer of GEOINT globally?

DIR. CLAPPER: Well, I think it – by the – its very availability, it promotes – it promotes that. I think the – if I can use the word, the universality of GEOINT is really coming into play. I used to say, when I was director of NGA, you know, everything and everybody's got to be someplace. So you have that basic foundational reference of the Earth and all that goes on in it. And that is the contextual array, the contextual depiction for overlaying all the other forms of intelligence.

And so to the extent that GEOINT is pervasive, it should be. And that's why I think what Tish is pushing here with – making it available to the customer. Now, that puts a burden, frankly, on GEOINT as a discipline, and particularly on NGA as an institution, to keep innovating, to keep coming up with new solutions, new ways, new creativity and how to portray GEOINT in context with the other disciplines.

MS. DEMPSEY: Following on that, a number of questions around big data and activity-based intelligence. How do you see the IC moving out, particularly on activity-based intelligence? And what do you think it should deliver?

DIR. CLAPPER: Well, this is the whole essence of what I was speaking about. You know, instead of, you know, kind of predicting, gee, where should we look tomorrow, if we can respond on a quick queuing-and-tipping basis, which, to me, is what activity-based intelligence is

all about – in other words, be queued, and then have the agility and capability to respond to those queues. And to me, that maybe simplistically is what activity-based intelligence is all about. It's not to say we neglect object-based intelligence either, which will also be quite important. But I think what is really new and different here is that – the notion of activity-based intelligence and what we're going to have to do to – in order to generate it as well as what we can do once we have it and can correlate, analyze it and then disseminate it.

MS. DEMPSEY: Director Clapper, what initiatives are under way or planned for improving intelligence integration and sharing with both U.S. and foreign law enforcement?

DIR. CLAPPER: Foreign law enforcement? Well, we – as I have found, we do a lot with foreign law enforcement. The FBI has a(n) extensive network of legal attaches, which are embedded in many, many embassies around the world. We do great work with our – with many of our law enforcement colleagues in foreign countries, and – although I think it's important to sort of make the distinction between law enforcement and intelligence. But what I have seen in my experience, particularly working with the FBI in this job and then overseas, is we've done – we do a lot towards enhancing law enforcement liaison with foreign partners.

And the same is true, by the way, big time with the – with DEA, the Drug Enforcement Administration, which does some magnificent work liaisons with counterparts overseas.

MS. DEMPSEY: Director Clapper, can you talk about how the intelligence community informs the Department of Justice when it is dealing with issues such as mergers of commercial entities supporting U.S. intelligence? I won't read what was actually written here, but that is a close approximation.

DIR. CLAPPER: Well, the – there is a rigorous process for this. And, you know, it is an interagency process involving the intelligence community, DOD, but – as we feed the Department of Justice and – when they make their determinations about such commercial endeavors.

MS. DEMPSEY: OK.

Now that you've had a chance to experience the ODNI and as director of intelligence, do you believe that DNI should serve term limits? And when you get your second term as DNI, what changes will you make?

DIR. CLAPPER: (Chuckles.) (Laughter.)

Well, actually, I do think you could make a case for having a fixed term somewhat akin to the FBI director who serves for 10 years. I don't know about 10 years – (chuckles) – but some fixed term, I think – I think there is an argument for that, assuming that you want to sustain the position as functionally apolitical. I mean, it is a political appointment, Senate-confirmable and all that. But I think, you know, one of the rock-bed pillars of – foundational pillars of intelligence is objectivity and independence. And I think a fixed term of some length – I don't know what it would be and – (chuckles) – not for me – would be – would be a good thing.

MS. DEMPSEY: Director Clapper, you have spoken at this conference, it seems, every year on the heels of some political controversy. Do you find – politics notwithstanding, do you believe that you can give your best advice and opinion to the political masters, whomever they may be?

DIR. CLAPPER: Well, I certainly have been able to with – in this administration. I have had some comments about, boy, you people in intelligence certainly have an inelegant sense of timing sometimes. But I've never had any pushback (substantively ?) on, you know, sort of delivering the bad news. And that would be, you know, my philosophy and my approach regardless. I just think that's fundamental rock-bed tenet of intelligence.

MS. DEMPSEY: As I mentioned earlier, we're going to talk about IT issues with the panel that's coming up next, but a lot of questions around IT. And I think this one is appropriate for the DNI to answer with increasing focus on sharing and IT and a cyber world. How do you think about the emergence of foreign 4G providers? Is there a role for them to play in U.S. and in supporting the government?

DIR. CLAPPER: Well, it depends on which ones, I guess.

MS. DEMPSEY: (Chuckles.)

DIR. CLAPPER: If you saw "60 Minutes" – (chuckles) – and the investigation that – if this is what you're referring to – that House Intelligence Committee did on Huawei – and actually both Huawei and ZTE – I get – you know, my whole approach to this issue in general, whether 4G providers or anything, is – with our foreign colleagues and partners – is the extent to which we can promote more security in our IT networks and in personal security, that that – those are the two pillar, two basic foundation aspects for ever-greater collaboration and integration, whatever form that takes. And so that was what was the occasion of this intelligence policy forum that I attended in Australia. And it is that which will enable all sorts of integration and collaboration. But that's kind of the price of admission, if you will.

MS. DEMPSEY: Great.

We see increasing pressure as we try to recruit young staff into the intelligence community, particularly young technical staff and engineers, who are attracted to Google, Facebook and some of the other commercial entities like that. Do you see those challenges? And how would you advise young people to think about a career in the intelligence community today?

DIR. CLAPPER: Well, we have – that's one of the things that concerns me about sequestration. You know, we brought on in the last decade some wonderful, wonderful young people. And they are terrific, absolutely terrific. They come to the business already IT-literate. They're fluent in this. That's a – that's a basis for – even before they walk in the door. And they are fantastic. And I have always felt that they are promoting a revolution beneath our feet, that,

you know, geezers like me may not even perceive. I know it's going on, and that's all a good thing.

And of course, I'm hopeful we can navigate through this sequestration challenge and keep those – as many of those people as we possibly can and continue to attract them because I think they do wonderful things within the intelligence community and, as I say, beneath our feet are promoting a revolution, in a sense, based on what they are exposed to in their – in their day – in their day-to-day lives.

MS. DEMPSEY: You've talked about sequestration. You've talked about how to avoid the train wreck of sequestration or the imperative to do that. If sequestration does happen and affordability is severely constrained, given that resilience, affordability, integration are all goals that we are driving to in the intelligence community, how do you stay on track, even in the face of such huge cuts? Can you cut, looking at capabilities rather than organizations?

DIR. CLAPPER: Well, the first challenge here will be to hopefully negotiate some relief on this PPA structure. I – that sounds terribly bureaucratic, but that's huge. And that is – that is currently what's in law based on what the appropriators have told us. If we could go to a lesser number of PPAs or lesser number of aggregations where we have more money or fewer pots, that – hopefully, that would give us a little bit more freedom and a little bit more latitude to decide where to take cuts.

The current arrangement presupposes that everything we do in intelligence is of equal import. And we all know that's not the case. So if we can get some relief there, and that's certainly the approach the administration would like to take, that would afford us a little bit more management latitude on how to manage these cuts. But in the absence of that, this could be – you know, this could be quite draconian.

Now, even so, the impact in terms of dollars would probably throttle us back to about where we were in 2008 or (200)9. So – (chuckles) – it's not to say we wouldn't have substantial capabilities. The issue is how the investment, how the money is allocated. And that's where I hope we're able to negotiate some more latitude on these financial aggregations.

MS. DEMPSEY: You have been very generous with your time and with your answers this morning. The last one I think is an interesting question and one that a number of people raised. And the question is, how do you think of the role and priority of human geography, another GEOINT area of focus? How important is it really? And do you see it as a future driver for GEOINT?

DIR. CLAPPER: Well, I think it's hugely important, and this is something, a discipline, if you will, an area of study and thought that I think has assumed greater and greater importance. And how people behave culturally and how they behave in relation to where they live and work and the effects of terrain on that, that's – it's a hugely important endeavor.

We've spent some time in some of the councils, in the – you know, the intelligence – what's called intelligence management board, which is a compilation – combination of all the

(nyms ?) and the functional managers and trying to sort out who's responsible for what in the area of human geography.

NGA by whatever construct has a huge role to play in this. And I think this gets back to Tish's push to make GEOINT available to the customer. But understanding behavior, human behavior, cultural drivers in the context of location and terrain and climate, is extremely important.

MS. DEMPSEY: Director Clapper, as always, you have given us a candid and insightful view of your role and position of your vision for the intelligence community. And thank you for your service, and thank you for being here.

DIR. CLAPPER: Thanks. (Applause.)

(END)